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ABSTRACT 
 
Many studies have examined the relationship between economic growth and finance.  A 
continuing question is the choice of a clear proxy for financial development.  This paper attempts 
to elucidate this issue from a developing country perspective, while controlling for financial 
repression.  The proxy of choice is the ratio of currency outside the banking system to real output 
(CB).  This proxy is unique in that it is related to the degree of financial repression, and thus 
relates differently to economic growth depending on the level of financial development.  The 
statistics support the hypothesis of a U-shaped behavior of CB with financial liberalization.  The 
empirical results show that CB relates negatively to growth in countries that are less financially 
liberalized and positively with growth in countries that are more financially liberalized.  The 
literature has used real interest rates as a measure of financial repression.  An innovative 
measure of financial repression is then proposed that combines the use of currency inside banks 
and currency outside banks, and is tested concurrently with a broad money depth measure.  The 
study is carried out using a panel approach, and the sample is also divided into different 
geographical regions, in order to see whether the relationship differs between geographical 
regions.  The study concludes that there is overwhelming evidence that financial repression, which 
is indicative of financial under-development, is negatively related to growth. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
eveloping countries have been engaging in financial reforms for the past two decades now.  The 
purpose of this study is to look at the empirical relationship between financial development and 
economic development from a developing country perspective, while controlling for financial 
repression and geographical proximity.  It must be noted that the relationship between financial development and 
growth is by no means widely accepted.  Robert Lucas (1988) has suggested that the link has been “badly over-
stressed”.  Stern (1989) writes a review of development economics, but does not mention the financial system.  
However, financial reforms in most developing countries are part and parcel of a move towards establishing 
economies that are more heavily private sector led.  This paper then attempts to highlight the relationship, if one 
exists, but purely from a developing country perspective.  To this end, the effect of financial development on growth 
is tested while controlling for financial repression, and geographical proximity.   
 
THEORY 
 
The literature in this area is vast.  The seminal work in the area was by Goldsmith (1969).  In his paper, he 
measured the level of financial development by comparing the value of financial intermediaries‟ assets to gross 
national product.  The key assumption here was that the size of the financial system has a positive correlation with 
the level of financial services provided.  This study was carried out on 35 countries with pre-1964 data, and also did 
not control for other factors influencing economic growth.  Goldsmith was able to find evidence that, as countries 
develop, the size of their banking sectors tend to become larger relative to national output.  Overall, this study did 
D 
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not attempt to make any causal relationships.  It simply indicated a correlation between financial development and 
economic development.  
 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) were among the first to provide a theoretical background for why 
financial development could cause growth.  Since then the literature has looked at financial development through 
measures of banking activity (King and Levine, 1993 a, b) and measures of stock market development (Atje and 
Jovanovic, 1993), and Levine and Zervos (1998).  The continuous problem identified in the literature has been a 
measure that can adequately capture the degree of financial development in all its changing aspects.  Several issues 
exist – the services provided by the financial system are diverse – these include mobilization of savings, 
diversification of risk, and management of the payment system.  Secondly, the agents that provide these financial 
services are diverse – these include banks, securities markets, and insurance companies, among others (Andres, 
Ignacio, and Lopez-Salido, 1999).  A third issue that has been tackled in a few instances in the literature is the fact 
that financial development also involves financial market deregulation, and this involves a reduced level of 
government restrictions, such as interest rate controls and price distortions in the financial sector.  
 
What impact does the financial system theoretically have on an economy?  To understand this link, one 
must first understand the functions that a financial system performs.  Levine (1997) has listed five functions that a 
financial system performs.  These are to enhance the mobilization of savings, the allocation of resources, portfolio 
diversification, the supervision of managers, and the facilitation of the exchange of goods and services.  There are 
then two channels through which each of these financial functions can affect economic growth – the capital 
accumulation channel and the technological innovation channel.  A financial system will alter the rate of capital 
accumulation by affecting the rate of savings, or by reallocating savings among new and different capital producing 
technologies.  The financial system will also affect the rate of technological innovation and thus affect the steady 
state level of growth in an economy.  It is expected that from a developing country perspective, development of a 
financial system will affect savings mobilization initially.  The logic of this idea is as follows: developing countries 
rely on the banking system.  As the financial system develops, the banking system is able to provide varied 
instruments that allow the mobilization of savings in new ways.  Savers are then able to take advantage of better 
financial instruments that provide them with a better risk-return trade-off.  Ultimately financial development means 
that savers can hold better portfolios. 
 
 But as Levine (1997) points out, financial development is also expected to affect economic growth through 
savings mobilization in another way.  Producers in an economy that is financially under-developed do not have 
access to multiple investors.  There exists an informational asymmetry.  Thus they produce at a scale that is 
economically inefficient.  A developed financial system provides a better opportunity for the efficient exchange of 
resources between savers and firms.  Firms can thus expand, and increase their production.  As they produce at a 
larger economic scale, they also become more efficient and productivity is improved, raising the rate of economic 
growth.  As Levine (1997) puts it, financial development can “profoundly affect economic development”. 
 
 Given that development of the financial sector is expected to positively impact economic growth, there are 
factors that are often present in developing countries that can hinder the development of the finance sector.  
Governments may place regulations on the financial sector in the form of price distortions and restrictions in order 
to maintain the financial sector as a source of public finance.  Examples of restrictions that often exist in developing 
countries are subsidized or directed credit, credit rationing, collusive contracts between public firms and banks, and 
caps on interest rates (Creane, et al, 2003).  These kinds of distortions in a free financial sector are commonly 
referred to as “financial repression”.  It is easy to see how financial repression would limit the functioning of the 
financial system and thus possibly affect investment and economic growth negatively.   
 
 Giovanni and de Melo (1993) have defined financial repression as a combination of controls on 
international capital flows and restrictions on domestic interest rates.  Typically researchers consider financial 
repression to be the product of artificially set interest rates that causes real interest rates to fall well below the rates 
of inflation.  Traditionally, domestic real interest rates (henceforth referred to as RI) are used in the literature as a 
measure of financial repression.  Government revenue is then calculated as differential between the foreign and 
domestic interest rates multiplied by the amount of government debt.  Giovanni and de Melo (1993) find that the 
revenue that governments make from financial repression is substantial and in some cases is even comparable to the 
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revenue from seigniorage.  It is important to note that in the absence of international financial controls, most cases of 
domestic controls on interest rates could be bypassed with foreign borrowing and lending.  However, controls on 
domestic interest rates are often coupled with restrictions on international borrowing and lending and this leads to a 
compromised financial system. 
 
 The literature on the finance-growth relationship has utilized both the cross-sectional approach and the time 
series approach.  Using a cross-sectional approach requires the averaging out of data over long time periods and then 
using the data in cross-sectional regressions that are aimed at explaining the cross-country variations in growth rates.  
These sorts of studies are then able to gauge the average effect of variables that affect economic growth rates.  Apart 
from the seminal King and Levine (1993) paper, there are other studies by Gelb (1989), Roubini and Sala-i-Martin 
(1992), and Fry (1996) that all use a cross-sectional approach.  However, cross-sectional studies have their fair share 
of critics.  The users of this technique have themselves pointed out shortcomings with this approach.  Evans (1995) 
refers to the econometric issues that arise with heterogeneous slope coefficients across countries.  The classic paper 
in the finance-growth literature is the King and Levine (1993) paper – the study covers the 1960-89 period and 
focuses on 77 countries.  The authors use various proxies for financial development, which are mostly monetary 
depth measures, and three growth variables (average growth rate of real GDP per capita, average growth rate of 
capital stock per capita, and a measure of total factor productivity).  Levine‟s paper utilizes cross-country data, and 
Levine himself alludes to the problems with using this kind of data.  There is the difficulty in establishing causality 
in cross-country data sets, and also the problem of average effects of financial development.   
 
Time series studies have not, however, clarified the relationship between finance and growth.  De Gregorio 
and Guidotti (1995) who discuss the pros and cons of various financial development proxies, have actually found a 
negative relationship between finance and growth.  Recent studies have begun to use panel data techniques to 
examine the issue.  Beck and Levine (2004) look at financial development through banks and also through the stock 
market.  They find that stock market liquidity – this is the ratio of the total value of shares traded to market 
capitalization – is positively related to growth.   
 
 Pesaran and Smith (1995) have suggested that panel data techniques with averaged data may still suffer 
from econometric problems.  Past studies have sometimes averaged data over a few years to remove business-cycle 
influences.  This may cause the loss of information on long-run relationships.  It has been suggested (Demetriades 
and Andrianova, 2003) that increasing data samples to forty or fifty years would make evidence from time-series 
utilizing techniques more conclusive, especially if the data is available in quarterly frequencies.  It must be 
recognized, however, that in studies that involve many countries, the lack of data availability is always an important 
consideration.  Developed countries usually have better data availability when compared to developing countries – 
since this is a developing country study; data restrictions are of prime concern.   
 
PROXIES OF FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
 Chen and Fische (1993) have discussed a theoretical reasoning that suggests that currency outside the 
banking system may be a good inverse proxy for financial development in developing countries.  They note that 
deposit insurance schemes do not have a very important role in developing countries which have less diversified 
economic bases.  Depositors thus tend to shy away from the banking system.  The result is that alternate informal 
arrangements such as savings clubs and rotating credit associations become more important in bridging the gap 
between the borrower and the lender.  This argument provides a further theoretical basis for the choice of currency 
outside the banking system as an inverse proxy for financial development.  The more developed a financial system, 
the greater the role that deposit insurance plays in the banking system, and thus the greater the amount of money 
within the banking system. 
 
Moreover, real interest rates in developing countries are on average, negative.  This in essence has been a 
characteristic of many developing countries as financially repressed economies.  Standard money demand models 
such as the Baumol-Tobin approach indicate that money holdings are inversely related to real interest rates.  
Therefore if real interest rates are negative, this would indicate a low level of deposits.  Financial repression, which 
is indicative of low financial development, is then characterized by a low ratio of deposits.  Thus private sector 
funds are not in the banking system but outside of it.  The higher the level of currency outside the banking system 
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(given a financially repressed economy), the lower the level of financial development, and the more restricted the 
access to those funds by investment projects.  This compromises the link between investment and economic growth.  
Thus a high ratio of currency outside the banking system should be negatively related to economic growth. 
 
 The logic behind using currency outside the banking system relative to real output as a proxy for financial 
development is as follows: as a country begins to develop its financial sector, the banking system develops first as 
an initial bridge between savers and borrowers.  If there is a large amount of money outside the banking system, this 
would indicate that the banking sector is compromised (perhaps through financial repression) and savers do not have 
access to varied instruments through the banking sector.  Thus a large amount of money outside the banking sector 
would seem to be an indicator of a lower level of financial development.  Most developing countries began the 
process of financial development within the last three decades.  More evolved methods of linkage between savers 
and borrowers such as mutual funds or stock markets are relatively recent introductions into these countries.   
 
At an intermediate level of financial sector development, CB may actually fall as savers explore increased 
options within the banking sector and firms flock to the banks for their financing needs.  However, as the level of 
financial sector development increases further, CB (and also deposits within the banking sector) may actually rise 
again as the development of institutions such as mutual funds and stock markets develop.  This is a proxy that can 
reflect the development of a financial sector given the removal of the elements of financial repression.  In countries 
in the initial stages of financial sector liberalization, the ratio is expected to be high, and negatively related to 
growth.  As countries reach the intermediate stage, the ratio is expected to fall, and then as countries reach the more 
advanced stages of financial sector development, the ratio is expected to rise again.  It must be noted of course, that 
financial sector development here is relative since the sample consists entirely of developing countries.  In the 
intermediate and higher growth countries, CB is expected to become positively related to growth.  Overall CB 
essentially fulfills the requirements of being a measure of financial development that can capture the degree of 
financial development in all its changing aspects.  The use of CB as a ratio of financial development begs the use of 
the opposite of CB – deposits within the banking sector over GDP (henceforth referred to as DGDP) as another 
proxy.  The results are expected to indicate the opposite relationship (when compared with CB) – a positive 
relationship with economic growth. 
 
Monetary depth measures have been used several times in past studies as representative of the formal size 
of the financial sector in an economy.  Goldsmith (1969) discussed the nature of the financial sector in developing 
countries.  Firms in developing countries resort to greater levels of self-finance than firms in developed countries.  
When financial instruments are issued by firms, they are primarily procured by financial institutions rather than 
private savers.  There are few large “organized” markets for the trade of securities such as bonds, mortgages, and 
stocks, mostly because such markets require economies of scale that are generally not present in developing 
countries.  There is thus limited direct contact between the savers and the borrowers and instead indirect interaction 
through the monetary mechanism, which is the lifeline of the financial sector.  It therefore becomes reasonable to 
develop theoretical models where money (defined to include all deposits in the banking sector, as well as currency) 
is the only financial asset available to savers.  (McKinnon, 1973) 
 
Uncertainties regarding risk and return are acute in developing countries and money becomes the asset that 
is most risk-free and default-free for short-term transactions.  Since lenders do not have access to sophisticated 
methods of risk-analysis (available in developed countries), financial instruments other than money cannot be well 
marketed.  Hence money becomes the choice instrument of private capital.  (McKinnon, 1973) 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Three proxies of financial development are used in this paper – CB, DGDP, and M - the choice of these 
measures is based on what makes logical and theoretical sense from a developing country perspective.  Lack of 
continuous data series for developing countries limits the sample size to 32 countries.  1995 is the base year for the 
consumer price index data for all thirty-two countries.  Raw data is transformed into the required variables of 
interest as follows: economic growth is calculated as the percentage change in GDP per capita; inflation is calculated 
as the percentage change in the consumer price index.  Real interest rates are calculated using the Fisher Identity, 
and are the difference between the nominal rate of return on 3-6 month deposits at banks and the inflation rate.  
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Currency outside the banking system (CB) is calculated as the ratio of currency outside domestic banks to nominal 
GDP.  Banking sector deposits (DGDP) is calculated as the ratio of total deposits (including checking, time and 
savings deposits) in the banking sector to nominal GDP.  Monetary depth (M) is the ratio of broad money (M2) to 
nominal GDP.  All the data is procured from the World Bank‟s World Development Indicators, and the IMF‟s 
International Financial Statistics. 
 
For the purposes of this study, M provides the standard against which other proxies are tested.  Greater 
broad money or narrow money depth indicates greater financial deepening, and a greater size of the formal financial 
sector, and thus represents greater financial development.  As mentioned though, these measures are prone to 
criticism; hence the search for more theoretically sound proxies is a worthwhile cause.  
 
This paper proposes a new measure for financial repression that actually combines both two proxies of 
financial development - CB and DGDP, and creates a new variable called FR (CB/DGDP).  It is proposed that the 
ratio of currency outside banks to currency inside banks can best proxy for financial repression.  If this ratio is low, 
then it could reflect a banking sector where savings and lending are allotted according to market forces.  This ratio 
would be low only if there was a marked absence of real interest rate ceilings and directed lending.  This proxy is 
especially important for countries where there is considerable government interference in the banking sector, that is, 
in less liberalized countries.  For example, most of the Sub-Saharan African countries still have banking sectors that 
are less developed than those of Asian countries, and where government still have interest rate ceilings in place.  In 
South East Asian countries, in comparison, where financial sector liberalization has been underway for almost two 
decades, financial repression is less of an issue.  
 
 
 
Table 1:  Behavior of Financial Development Proxies Over Time for the Different Regions  (Mean Values Over Time) 
Period  
1970-1980 
CB* M* DGDP* RI** FR* 
Full sample 0.489 21.991 0.186 -8.133 3.979 
Africa 0.477 21.202 0.171 -5.917 4.849 
Latin America 0.402 18.946 0.199 -23.841 2.367 
South-East Asia 0.601 26.745 0.219 -0.678 2.995 
Period  
1981-1990 
CB* M* DGDP* RI** FR* 
Full sample 0.496 28.894 0.236 3.145 3.225 
Africa 0.503 27.581 0.207 -7.803 4.148 
Latin America 0.388 23.219 0.222 40.824 1.956 
South-East Asia 0.569 37.319 0.326 4.216 1.806 
Period  
1991-2002 
CB* M* DGDP* RI** FR* 
Full sample 0.475 32.256 0.269 -1.762 3.104 
Africa 0.468 26.889 0.214 -3.849 4.089 
Latin America 0.368 24.486 0.223 0.048 1.948 
South-East Asia 0.589 52.032 0.458 2.477 1.423 
*Nominal values,  **Real values,  ***All entries are mean values over sample countries. 
 
 
In Table 1 above, CB is the ratio of currency outside the banking system to GDP, M is the ratio of M2 to 
GDP, DGDP is the ratio of banking sector deposits to GDP, RINT is the real interest rate (calculated as per the 
Fisher Identity), and FR is CB/DGDP.   Table 1 above clearly supports the hypothesis that the CB ratios display a U-
shaped characteristic in relation to the level of financial sector development.  In the African and South East Asian 
group of countries, the CB values are consistently higher than those in the Latin American group.   
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for all proxies (FD and financial repression) for full sample and regions 
Period 1970-2002 CB* M* DGDP* RI** FR* 
Full sample 0.486 27.815 0.231 -2.398 3.432 
Africa 0.481 25.221 0.197 -5.737 4.361 
Latin America 0.385 22.391 0.215 4.441 2.090 
South-East Asia 0.587 39.508 0.338 1.907 2.063 
*Nominal values   **Real values 
 
 
 The above descriptive statistics in Table 2 reveal some interesting facts about the relationship between 
financial development and financial repression.  When the descriptive statistics are calculated by region, it is evident 
that the overall sample statistics conceal significant differences between the regions.  The overall sample is heavily 
weighted towards the African countries, which are greater in number in the sample than the countries from the two 
other regions.  The African sample is close to the average CB value for the full sample.  South East Asia on the other 
hand, has a higher CB ratio than the full sample average.  This is not surprising because the average South East 
Asian country is more financially liberalized (in terms of the availability of non-bank financial instruments and a 
longer existence of fully functioning stock markets) than the countries in, for example, the African sample.  For the 
full period 1970-2002, the CB values again display the U-shaped behavior that was displayed in Table 1.   
 
Within the banking sector, South East Asian countries also have higher ratios of DGDP reflecting not only 
a greater degree of economic growth (thus a greater savings ratio), but also a greater degree of saver faith and 
financial return in the banking sector due to less financial repression.  The overall sample‟s statistics indicate that, 
on average, the African group of countries is financially repressed (reflected by negative RI).  As the analysis 
proceeds to the Latin American and South East Asian groups of countries, the RI values on average become 
positive.   
 
 The new FR variable highlights the degree of financial repression even more starkly.  The degree of 
financial repression (as measured by FR) in the African sample is more than twice that of both the Latin American 
and the South East Asian sample.  This indicates that a very high degree of money is outside the banking sector in 
the African sample.  In these countries, that have a lesser degree of financial development, the non-bank financial 
sector is rather under-developed and there are not many alternative instruments such as mutual funds or long-
standing and fully functioning stock markets.  Thus savers shy away from the banking sector, not only due to low 
economic growth (which causes a low savings rate), but also due to depressed real interest rates (as evidenced by the 
average negative real interest rates in the African sample).  Overall then, the FR values behave as expected and on 
average, fall as finance become more liberalized. 
 
 It is interesting to consider the relationship between the proxies themselves, and also with investment.  This 
relationship is not a priori clear-cut.  CB could be expected to be inversely correlated with DGDP, since the higher 
the level of currency outside the banking sector, the lower the level of currency inside the banking sector.  However, 
in a case where an economy is highly developed, a high level of CB could go hand in hand with an increased level 
of DGDP because both bank and non-bank sectors offer a multitude of options for savers.  CB is expected to be 
positively correlated with M, because CB is in effect part of M.  The proxies are expected to be positively correlated 
with investment due to the capital accumulation theory.  Table 3 shows the averaged cross-sectional correlations 
between financial development and investment for the entire sample period T.  As expected all the proxies are 
positively correlated with INV; DGDP shows the strongest correlation due to the fact that investment directly 
depends on the amount of deposits available for investors to borrow.  The correlation between CB and DGDP is 
positive, possibly reflecting a greater weight from those economies further along the development spectrum.  It must 
be noted though that since if money growth is positive, then both CB and DGDP are expected to display positive 
growth as well, and the positive correlation may be displaying the growth of both measures.  
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Table 3: Correlation Between FD Proxies, FR and Investment 
 CB M DGDP FR INV 
CB 1.0000 0.344656 
(0.451167)* 
0.164884 
(0.455132)* 
* 0.010128 
(0.441612)* 
M  1.0000 0.708602 
(0.354261)* 
-0.37024 
(0.463497)* 
0.196427 
(0.391622)* 
DGDP   1.0000 * 0.209362 
(0.325124)* 
FR    1.0000 -0.16926 
(0.410229)* 
INV     1.0000 
*Correlations are not performed between FR, CB and DGDP since CB and DGDP are components of FR. 
**Standard deviations in parentheses 
Correlations taken over the full sample 1970-2002 for all countries in the total sample 
 
 
THE MODEL 
 
Using OLS on pool data has been shown in the literature to be a good way to get first pass point estimates.  
Several econometric analyses, for example those by Phillips and Moon (1999) and Pedroni (2000) have shown that 
OLS estimators are consistent with pool data.  As N (the number of cross-sectional units) increases, however, the 
residual asymptotic bias increases.    
 
The standard approach in the literature is to use a panel regression of the form: 
 
X it = itFD + itZ + it  (1) 
 
X represents the growth of per capita real GDP (this factor could also be a measure of the total factor 
productivity growth) in country i at time t.  The set of FD contains variables that represent financial development.  
This set comprises of CB, DGDP and M.   
 
Z is a vector of conditioning variables, and usually includes other factors that theoretically affect economic 
growth.  One of the factors in the set of Z may be the log of initial real GDP per capita.  This factor measures the 
convergence effect.  The literature has included such variables as the log of initial higher education enrollment as a 
measure of human capital, and the population growth rate.  Other factors that are sometimes included here include 
the inflation rate, an export and import to real GDP ratio factor (to measure openness), etc.  In the case of this paper, 
the set of Z is restricted to first four and then five variables – the log of initial lagged GDP per capita, GDP(-1), the 
degree of openness of the economy, OPEN, a measure of inflation, INF, a measure of real interest rates, RI, and a 
dummy variable for excess money growth, DM.  GDP(-1) measures the convergence effect over time.  OPEN 
(measured as the sum of foreign direct investment (FDI) and total credit from foreign sources
1
) indicates that the 
more open an economy, the greater the degree of economic development is expected to be, because the greater the 
potential for technology transfer and technology mimicry.  As mentioned earlier, decreased openness is consistent 
with financial repression whereby domestic agents are restricted from foreign borrowing and lending.  A greater 
degree of openness is therefore indicative of a lesser degree of financial repression.  INF is the percentage change in 
the annual GDP deflator, and DM is set to capture excess money growth of over 10% per annum. 
 
A priori, the null hypothesis is for   (the coefficient on financial development) is expected to differ 
depending on the proxy being used for financial development.  When FD is restricted to CB, the null hypothesis for 
the overall sample is that   will be negatively and significantly related to growth (following the Chen-Fische 
(1993) paper.  However this null hypothesis only holds with reference to the overall sample.  (A discussion on what 
  is expected to be for the different geographical regions follows shortly.)  When the FD vector is restricted to 
include M alone, the coefficient on   is expected to be positive for the overall sample and all sub-samples 
                                                 
1 Sum of lines 78bed and 78bid from the IMF‟s International Financial Statistics. 
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(following the implications of the King and Levine papers).  Finally, when the FD vector is restricted to include 
DGDP alone, the coefficient on   is expected to be positive for the overall sample and all subs-samples. 
 
In this paper, the basic methodology is transformed to include a financial repression variable, and a set of 
financial development variables as well as the vector of Z variables.  Equation (1) is then transformed to equation 
(2) below. 
 
X it = it itFR FD  + itZ + it   (2) 
 
 A priori, in equation 2 above, the  variable is expected to differ in value depending on the sample being 
tested (the null hypotheses for  for the sub-samples are discussed shortly).  For the overall sample, the coefficient 
on  is expected to be negative and significant following the theoretical implications described in section 3A.  The 
null hypotheses for   are as described for equation 1.   
 
 Several regression results are presented.  First a broad regression (equation 1) for the entire sample period 
is examined to test for the overall relationship between finance and growth; financial repression is measured by RI.  
Thereafter, the regression is re-run for different geographical regions – Africa, Latin America and South-East Asia 
for the full sample period.  Equation 2, where FD is measured by M and financial repression is measured by FR is 
then run on the broad sample and all the sub-samples.   
 
For robustness purposes, a dummy variable is created for excess money growth (above 10% per year) in all 
the thirty-three countries.  The sample is thus split again to test the broad regression (including the dummy for 
money growth) for the different geographical areas. The regional grouping also serves to split countries according to 
according to whether they classify as “financially repressed” or “financially liberalized”.  This classification based 
on real interest rates is due to Pill and Pradhan (1997).  On average the African countries exhibit the greatest degree 
of financial repression.   
 
RESULTS 
 
 Table 4 (Appendix) presents the results of eight regressions on the entire sample period, 1970-2002, for the 
different groups of developing countries, with and without the DM variable.  The proxy of choice in table 2 is the 
CB variable.  The null hypothesis in regression 1 is that CB will be negatively related to growth.  When the 
regression is run for all 32 countries (equation 1), the ratio of currency outside the banking system to GDP is 
significantly negative.  The null hypothesis is accepted.  Theory suggests (as discussed earlier) that this is indicative 
of a poorly developed financial system, which then translates into a poor link between savers and borrowers, and 
thus decreased efficiency in the savings-investment link, leading to lower real output.   
 
However, as discussed earlier, overall results are not indicative of differences in the different geographical 
regions.  Therefore the regression is then performed for the different country groupings.  The statistical behavior of 
the CB ratio (as shown earlier) is that it displays a U-shape.  The coefficient on CB is significant and negatively 
related to growth in equation 2, the sample of African countries, (as expected), again reflecting the poor state of 
financial sector development in these countries.  The null hypothesis is again accepted here.  In the Latin American 
regression (equation 3), the variable is not significant, although it is a negative coefficient.  The null hypothesis thus 
cannot be accepted in the Latin American sample.  South-East Asia (equation 4) has higher growth rates than the 
rest of the developing countries in this sample, and thus it is not surprising that the ratio is significantly (at the 5% 
level) positively related to growth in this region (reflecting the right hand end of the U).  The South-East Asian 
countries have financial systems that are better developed and offer a more diverse array of financial instruments 
outside the banking sector to savers, and firms.  The null hypothesis in equation 4 is that CB will be significantly 
positively related to growth, and the results for equation 4 shows that CB is indeed positively and significantly 
related to growth here and thus the null hypothesis is accepted here.  Overall, the results indicate that the CB proxy 
does indeed fulfill the function of a measure of financial development that can capture the changing nature of the 
financial sector as a result of liberalization.   
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With reference to the RI variable, it is expected that only in the countries that are financially repressed will 
the variable turn out to be significantly related to growth.  The null hypothesis then states that RI will be negatively 
related to growth in the African sample only.  As expected, only in African countries is the financial repression 
variable (RI) shown to negatively impact growth.  The coefficient on this variable is negative and significant in this 
sample of countries.  African countries have long experienced financial repression, which usually has been part of 
political repression, and it is only recently that some African countries have begun the process of liberalization of 
finance and trade.  This finding echoes previous findings in the literature that indicate the excessive regulations and 
distortions in the financial market negatively impact the savings-investment link and thus negatively impact growth. 
 
 When the regressions are run with the dummy variable for excessive money growth included (Table 4 – 
equation 1b, 2b, 3b and 4b), the results show that excessive money growth negatively affects economic growth 
(without entering into the well-known and ongoing discussion about the causality between money and output).  
Indeed, the DM variable shows a significantly negative coefficient for all the samples (it is very close to the 
significance level for the South-East Asian countries), except for Latin America.  In the Latin American sample, 
surprisingly, it very clearly shows a positive relationship.  In Latin America, excess money growth seems to 
positively affect output.  Further discussion on the effects of money growth on output differences is left for another 
study as the discussion best fits the money-output literature. 
 
 Theory predicts that the larger the monetary depth measure, the larger the size of the formal financial 
system, and thus the higher the rate of economic growth.  Since M2 contains more developed savings instruments 
such as money market mutual funds and time deposits, it would indicate that there are other options for savers 
besides the basic checking and savings deposits.  Mutual funds and time deposits may be offered by institutions 
other than the banking system and thus a high monetary depth ratio may exist simultaneously with a high currency 
outside the banking system ratio.  Table 5 (Appendix) shows the results of the regression with the variable in the FD 
vector being M representing the size of the financial sector.  When the regression is run for all countries in the 
sample together, the results indicate a strongly significant positive relationship between M and growth.  The null 
hypothesis that M will strongly positively impact growth is accepted here.  The results are less clear, however, when 
the region-specific results are analyzed.  In the African group, the coefficient is both positive and insignificant, 
indicating that financial depth is not important in explaining growth.  In the Latin American and South East Asian 
groups, the coefficient is negative in sign, but insignificant.  In equations 2, 3 and 4 therefore, the null hypothesis 
that the formal size of the financial sector positively affects growth cannot be accepted.   
 
Table 5 (Appendix) also displays the results for the same regression discussed above, but with the dummy 
for money growth included (equations 1b, 2b, 3b, and 4b).  The results are robust to the inclusion of the dummy – 
money does not seem to significantly relate to growth in all sub-sets of the samples.  The results mirror those of 
Table 4, in that excessive money growth is shown to negatively impact economic growth in all the samples, except 
the Latin American group.  The Latin American countries thus present something of a paradox – monetary depth 
seems to negatively affect growth, although the effect is very small, while excess money growth positively affects 
growth.   
 
In Table 6 (Appendix), the basic model‟s FD vector in restricted to include the third proxy for financial 
development, DGDP.  Theory suggests that DGDP should have a positive correlation with growth.  The null 
hypothesis is then that DGDP will positively impact growth in the overall sample and all sub-samples.  The overall 
regression presents a very strong positive correlation between DGDP and growth (the null is accepted here).  On 
closer observation with the region-specific regressions, it becomes evident that this relationship is not uniform 
across all regional groupings.  The relationship is strongly positive in the African group of countries, although the 
significance is lost when the dummy for excessive money growth is included.  The savings-investment link is a more 
developed one in South East Asia and so the coefficient presents the expected positive value. 
 
In the Latin American group of countries, the proxy displays an insignificant negative relationship.  The 
null hypothesis is very significantly rejected here.  A possible explanation could be related to the politico-economic 
and currency fluctuations within Latin America that has led to a preference for non-local currency based assets 
outside the banking sector (DeGregorio and Guidotti (1995) refer to the “extreme experiments of financial 
liberalization” in Latin America during the 1970s and 1980s, which then subsequently caused economic collapses).   
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Regardless of the proxy for financial development being used, the dummy variable for excessive money growth 
consistently reflects a negative relationship between excess money growth and economic growth, except in Latin 
America.  The Latin American group of countries therefore continues to display results that are diametrically 
opposite to those in the other regional splits. 
 
 Table 7 (Appendix) presents the results for the innovative approach where FR measures financial 
repression (as opposed to a more traditional measure where real interest rates proxy for financial repression).  The 
FR variable is run simultaneously with the monetary depth variable M, which is used as a standard measure of the 
size of the formal financial sector.  Recalling earlier findings, the FR ratio progressively decreased with financial 
liberalization.  The null hypothesis for equations 1, 1b, 2 and 2b is that FR will be significantly and negatively 
related to growth. 
 
 The results strongly support the use of FR as a measure of financial repression, and justify the importance 
of controlling for financial repression as well as financial development when looking at the effect of finance on 
growth.  FR turns out to be strongly negative in the overall regression, and moreover it is also strongly negative in 
the African sample of countries, which is more financially repressed than the other groups.  The results are also 
robust to the inclusion of the dummy variable for excess money growth.  In equations 3, 3b, 4, and 4b the null 
hypothesis changes and it is expected that FR will be positively and significantly related to growth.  However, the 
evidence for this null hypothesis is not strong.  In both the other two groups of countries, as expected (because they 
are more financially liberalized than Africa), the coefficient turns out to have a positive (albeit insignificant) 
relationship with growth.  In this group of counties, there are better-developed savings channels outside the banking 
sector, and so the ratio of CB to DGDP would be lower.  This is then consistent with the results from the regression 
analysis.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The relationship between finance and growth while theoretically sound is not unanimously agreed upon 
empirically.  This paper looked at the relationship between financial development and growth while controlling for 
financial repression and geographical proximity.  Currency outside the banking system relative to GDP (CB), broad 
money relative to GDP (M), and deposits within the banking sector relative to GDP (DGDP) are used as proxies for 
financial development.  CB is a unique proxy in that it explains, to some extent, why there are so many different 
findings in the literature regarding the relationship between financial development and growth.  These findings are 
very sensitive to the choice of proxy.  The standard monetary depth measures may not be adequate in examining this 
relationship, because seigniorage can cause monetary depth to increase, falsely indicating financial sector 
development.  It is also evident that monetary depth measures can increase in spite of the existence of financial 
repression, which indicates a paradoxical state of existence for an economy.  CB reflects the development of the 
financial sector given the knowledge of the liberalization of the financial sector and the degree of financial 
repression.  The results show that CB is related negatively to growth in the less liberalized developing countries and 
positively in the more liberalized developing countries. 
 
 Past studies have attempted to class countries on income levels, but the results in this paper indicate that 
even within developing countries, geographical (as well as socio-economic) proximity seems to be a factor in 
whether the relationship between financial development and growth differ.  This finding has a very important 
implication in terms of development strategy.  If countries that are close together are financially repressed, financial 
liberalization may not work to promote growth if the surrounding countries (especially the trading partners) are not 
financially liberalized as well.  For example, land-locked countries rely on their partners with seaports for trade 
purposes.  If the land-locked countries engage in liberalization, both financial and otherwise, but the neighboring 
seaport country does not, liberalization may not impact growth significantly.  Needless to say, financial development 
must be part and parcel of a more comprehensive development package that targets all aspects of economic growth. 
 
 The results indicate that it is important to control for financial repression when looking at the relationship 
between financial development and growth.  Traditionally financial repression is measured through the use of real 
interest rates.  An innovative measure of financial repression (FR) combines the use of the ratio of currency outside 
banks to currency inside banks relative to GDP.  In economies where there is a low level of financial sector 
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liberalization, the ratio becomes particularly illuminative.  The results show that countries with low levels of FR 
relative to the average are higher growth economies.  In the African sub-sample of countries, FR is significantly 
negative in relation to economic growth.  Surprisingly the results for all the financial development proxies seem to 
indicate that financial sector development has not been very important in explaining Latin American growth.  
 
 Further work needs to be done to identify a more complete measure of financial development.  An ideal 
measure would encompass deregulation of the financial sector, size of the financial sector, and stock market 
development.  
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Appendix: Table 4: Financial Development Proxy: CB 
 
Dependent variable: Growth rate of real GDP per capita (sample period 1970-2002) 
 All Countries Africa Latin America South-East Asia 
 Eq. 1 Eq. 1b Eq. 2 Eq. 2b Eq. 3 Eq. 3b Eq. 4 Eq. 4b 
C 
2.402840 
(4.238417)** 
2.497646 
(4.433802)** 
3.622998 
(4.331817)** 
3.863590 
(4.675011)** 
1.487037 
(1.201052) 
1.001298 
(0.794060) 
0.027234 
(0.007933) 
0.639602 
(0.185950) 
GDP(-1) 
-0.086363 
(1.643549) 
-0.080851 
(-1.560567) 
-0.022127 
(-0.243648) 
-0.020850 
(-0.234756) 
-0.012963 
(-0.247563) 
-0.001267 
(-0.023326) 
0.266323 
(0.448897) 
0.191177 
(0.323917) 
RI 
0.000694 
(1.096119) 
0.000722 
(1.107688) 
-0.043855 
(-1.547698)** 
-0.052442 
(-1.887966)** 
0.000205 
(0.570795) 
0.000164 
(0.483735) 
0.014334 
(0.342875) 
0.036147 
(0.873085) 
CB 
-1.316516 
(-1.993393)** 
-1.076274 
(1.677605) 
-4.060607 
(-4.280970)** 
-3.478344 
(-3.794612)** 
-1.077839 
(-0.498092) 
-1.086889 
(-0.491527) 
1.716058 
(2.163687)** 
1.882106 
(2.375579)* 
INF 
-0.006364 
(-2.135272)** 
-0.006512 
(2.145754)** 
-0.076707 
(-2.754965)** 
-0.087384 
(-3.165435)** 
-0.004015 
(-2.419554)** 
-0.003707 
(-2.357813)** 
-0.028419 
(-0.695895) 
-0.035490 
(-0.895081) 
OPEN 
0.232551 
(3.629416)** 
0.235466 
(3.640161)** 
0.184302 
(2.435591)** 
0.190586 
(2.526445)** 
0.186877 
(1.071609) 
0.193366 
(1.089477) 
0.194032 
(0.651251) 
0.233573 
(0.861263) 
DM  
-1.543206 
(3.315909)** 
 
-2.489706 
(-3.987366)** 
 
1.767749 
(2.021807)** 
 
-2.343405 
(-2.843786)** 
Adjusted 
R-squared 
0.03 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.09 
t-statistics in parentheses are White‟s heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics.   **t statistics significant at 1%      * t-statistics significant at 5% 
The dependent variable is the growth rate of real GDP per capita 
GDP(-1) is the initial level of real GDP 
RI is real interest rates calculated according to the Fisher Identity 
CB is the ratio of currency outside the banking sector to GDP (both numerator and denominator are in nominal values) 
INF is the annual rate of increase in the GDP deflator 
OPEN is the sum of lines 78bed and 78 bid from the IMF‟s IFS database 
DM is the dummy variable for excess money growth (measured as annual rates of growth of 10% or more) 
Ho: CB is significantly and negatively related to growth in eqs. 1, 1b, 2, and 2b.   Ho: CB is significantly and positively related to growth in eqs. 3, 3b, 4 and 4b. 
Ho: RI is significantly and negatively related to growth in equations 1, 1b, 2, and 2b.  Ho: RI is significantly and positively related to growth in equations 3, 3b, 4 and 4b. 
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Appendix: Table 5: Financial Development Proxy: M 
 
Dependent variable: Growth rate of real GDP per capita (sample period 1970-2002) 
 All Countries Africa Latin America South-East Asia 
 Eq. 1 Eq. 1b Eq. 2 Eq. 2b Eq. 3 Eq. 3b Eq. 4 Eq. 4b 
C 
1.097327 
(1.962020)* 
1.330951 
(2.394463)** 
2.186075 
(2.633742)** 
2.762327 
(3.376482)** 
1.578440 
(0.959037) 
0.857516 
(0.522489) 
-4.471848 
(-) 
-4.086026 
(-1.025948) 
GDP(-1) 
-0.078761 
(-1.447729) 
-0.073268 
(-1.368622) 
-0.116984 
(-1.254001) 
-0.102150 
(-1.128735) 
-0.017674 
(-0.303524) 
-0.002469 
(-0.041562) 
1.207814 
(1.520176) 
1.186918 
(1.659666) 
RI 
0.000523 
(0.969460) 
0.000597 
(1.004008) 
-0.027686 
(-0.979989) 
-0.039910 
(-1.453725) 
0.000199 
(0.572773) 
0.000141 
(0.436297) 
0.025053 
(0.937132) 
0.035939 
(0.80053) 
M 
0.021621 
(2.209510)** 
0.018553 
(2.052905)** 
0.001953 
(0.174695) 
-0.000910 
(-0.083315) 
-0.023464 
(-0.400281) 
-0.013700 
(-0.234294) 
0.019234 
(0.937132) 
-0.013934 
(-0.654882) 
INF 
-0.005397 
(-2.083833)** 
-0.005818 
(-2.095472)** 
-0.066813 
(-2.398854)** 
-0.080594 
(-2.929133)** 
-0.004138 
(-2.410565)** 
-0.003711 
(-2.306539)** 
-0.035703 
(-0.793163) 
-0.039782 
(-0.886310) 
OPEN 
0.217895 
(3.652071)** 
0.218359 
(3.656869)** 
0.235007 
(3.013396)** 
0.234693 
(2.955254)** 
0.236599 
(1.187606) 
0.226927 
(1.126206) 
-0.947164 
(-1.298190) 
-0.801312 
(-1.157026) 
DM  
-1.473281 
(-3.131815)** 
 
-2.761851 
(-4.263707)** 
 
1.747466 
(1.978409)* 
 
-1.313294 
(-1.767505) 
Adjusted 
R-squared 
0.03 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.08 
t-statistics in parentheses are White‟s heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics.   **t statistics significant at 1%      * t-statistics significant at 5% 
The dependent variable is the growth rate of real GDP per capita 
GDP(-1) is the initial level of real GDP 
RI is real interest rates calculated according to the Fisher Identity 
M is the ratio of M2 to GDP (both numerator and denominator are in nominal values) 
INF is the annual rate of increase in the GDP deflator 
OPEN is the sum of lines 78bed and 78 bid from the IMF‟s IFS database 
DM is the dummy variable for excess money growth (measured as annual rates of growth of 10% or more) 
Ho: M is significantly and positively related to growth in all equations.  
Ho: RI is significantly and negatively related to growth in equations 1, 1b, 2, and 2b.  Ho: RI is significantly and positively related to growth in equations 3, 3b, 4 and 4b.  
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Appendix: Table 6: Financial Development Proxy: DGDP 
 
Dependent variable: Growth rate of real GDP per capita (sample period 1970-2002) 
 All Countries Africa Latin America South-East Asia 
         
C 
0.636714 
(1.241928) 
0.936228 
(1.808273) 
1.209627 
(1.561390) 
1.906548 
(2.522122)** 
2.539142 
(1.721417) 
1.551427 
(1.038724) 
-4.301630 
(-0.978343) 
-4.041315 
(-0.918312) 
GDP(-1) 
-0.064303 
(-1.211474) 
-0.061765 
(-1.169097) 
-0.084639 
(-0.916133) 
-0.076104 
(-0.849309) 
-0.038331 
(-0.643008) 
-0.017261 
(-0.282304) 
1.194265 
(1.435496) 
1.199878 
(1.447809) 
RI 
0.000530 
(0.964697) 
0.000602 
(0.999707) 
-0.027878 
(-0.996244) 
-0.039414 
(-1.447283)* 
0.000205 
(0.619666) 
0.000150 
(0.479863) 
0.020300 
(0.479035) 
0.032448 
(0.744155) 
DGDP 
4.235514 
(3.859902)** 
3.547707 
(3.498062)** 
3.995771 
(2.931631)** 
3.090618 
(2.336447)** 
-6.197412 
(-1.265309) 
-4.003871 
(-0.820124) 
2.2126635 
(0.929172) 
1.338871 
(0.586651) 
INF 
-0.005533 
(-2.101259)** 
-0.005923 
(-2.112104)** 
-0.065753 
(-2.393286)** 
-0.078830 
(-2.900402)** 
-0.004085 
(-2.617976)** 
-0.003718 
(-2.502373)** 
-0.040323 
(-0.930369) 
-0.043319 
(-1.005860) 
OPEN 
0.198033 
(3.487750)** 
0.201842 
(3.540653)** 
0.219762 
(2.953599)** 
0.222280 
(2.921568)** 
0.265529 
(1.454114) 
0.247526 
(1.339211) 
-0.945962 
(-1.323640) 
-0.791210 
(-1.184242) 
DM  
-1.356186 
(-2.891030)** 
 
-2.638875 
(-4.118925)** 
 
1.610828 
(1.813922) 
 
-1.295045 
(-1.816502)** 
Adjusted 
R-squared 
0.04 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.10 
t-statistics in parentheses are White‟s heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics.   **t statistics significant at 1%      * t-statistics significant at 5% 
The dependent variable is the growth rate of real GDP per capita 
GDP(-1) is the initial level of real GDP 
RI is real interest rates calculated according to the Fisher Identity 
DGDP is the ratio of banking sector deposits to GDP (both numerator and denominator are in nominal values) 
INF is the annual rate of increase in the GDP deflator 
OPEN is the sum of lines 78bed and 78 bid from the IMF‟s IFS database 
DM is the dummy variable for excess money growth (measured as annual rates of growth of 10% or more) 
Ho: DGDP is significantly and positively related to growth in all equations.  
Ho: RI is significantly and negatively related to growth in equations 1, 1b, 2, and 2b.  Ho: RI is significantly and positively related to growth in equations 3, 3b, 4 and 4b.  
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Appendix: Table 7: Financial Repression Variable: FR; Financial Development Proxy: M 
 
Dependent variable: Growth rate of real GDP per capita (sample period 1970-2002) 
 All Countries Africa Latin America South-East Asia 
C 
1.568717 
(2.535314)** 
1.719512 
(2.787565)** 
2.616355 
(3.080592)** 
2.952499 
(3.522414)** 
0.148234 
(0.083066) 
-0.231335 
(-0.128523) 
-1.121635 
(-0.300035) 
-1.011934 
(-0.274872) 
GDP(-1) 
-0.023173 
(-0.467828) 
-0.025713 
(-0.526762) 
0.056253 
(0.604061) 
0.034495 
(0.379528) 
-0.016851 
(-0.286443) 
-0.002661 
(-0.044487) 
0.760507 
(1.133501) 
0.801135 
(1.233191) 
FR 
-0.158603 
(-2.708823)** 
-0.136280 
(-2.359584)** 
-0.239393 
(-3.475372)** 
-0.195239 
(-2.860332)** 
0.359880 
(1.256131) 
0.285001 
(0.993561) 
0.055648 
(0.299931) 
0.136621 
(0.693468) 
M 
0.008617 
(0.846753) 
0.009156 
(0.911235) 
-0.026053 
(-1.930438) 
-0.022919 
(-1.721531) 
0.004461 
(0.076646) 
0.007663 
(0.131046) 
-0.022557 
(-0.865526) 
-0.026591 
(-1.045750) 
INF 
-0.004388 
(-4.265032)** 
-0.004503 
(-4.253011)** 
-0.050525 
(-3.650035)** 
-0.053506 
(-3.888519)** 
-0.003321 
(-5.627219)** 
-0.003126 
(-5.261700)** 
-0.042895 
(-0.959747) 
-0.057499 
(-1.288916)** 
OPEN 
0.216454 
(3.657397)** 
0.219822 
(3.684691)** 
0.218746 
(2.843832)** 
0.222573 
(2.849249)** 
0.241603 
(1.204409) 
0.231439 
(1.141297) 
0.249325 
(-0.872533) 
0.286616 
(1.100273) 
DM  
-1.381757 
(-2.955714)** 
 
-2.359342 
(-3.814242)** 
 
1.663402 
(1.887061) 
 
-2.371291 
(-2.912096)** 
Adjusted 
R-squared 
0.04 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.08 
t-statistics in parentheses are White‟s heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics.   **t statistics significant at 1%   
The dependent variable is the growth rate of real GDP per capita 
GDP(-1) is the initial level of real GDP 
FR is the ratio of CB to DGDP (both numerator and denominator are in nominal values) 
M is the ratio of M2 to GDP (both numerator and denominator are in nominal values) 
INF is the annual rate of increase in the GDP deflator 
OPEN is the sum of lines 78bed and 78 bid from the IMF‟s IFS database 
DM is the dummy variable for excess money growth (measured as annual rates of growth of 10% or more) 
Ho: M is significantly and positively related to growth in all equations.  
Ho: FR is significantly and negatively related to growth in equations 1, 1b, 2, and 2b.  Ho: RI is significantly and positively related to growth in equations 3, 3b, 4 and 4b.  
 
 
 
